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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3297 
____________ 
 
THOMAS I. GAGE, 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., AS; MR. LUKE 
ANDERSEN; MRS. HELENA ANDERSEN 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 3-12-cv-00777) 
District Judge: Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 16, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Thomas Gage appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his 
complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 In 2008, Gage defaulted on his mortgage, and Wells Fargo, the assignee of the 
mortgage, filed a foreclosure complaint in the Superior Court of New Jersey.  Gage failed 
to file a responsive pleading or contest the matter in any way, and so a final judgment of 
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foreclosure was entered on April 13, 2010.  A Sheriff’s sale was held on July 6, 2010, 
and the property was sold to Wells Fargo.  Gage refused to leave, and so he and his 
family were evicted.  The property eventually was sold to Luke and Helena Andersen in 
October, 2011.  
 Prior to the sale of the property, Gage filed his first pro se federal complaint 
relating to the foreclosure in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey.  Gage sought to overturn the state judgment of foreclosure in this federal action 
by alleging that Wells Fargo never owned the mortgage and therefore had no right to 
foreclose upon it.  Gage further alleged that Wells Fargo and Sheriff Frank Provenzano 
committed criminal and fraudulent acts throughout the foreclosure process.  The District 
Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and Gage 
appealed.
1
  We summarily affirmed the District Court, see Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., AS, 521 Fed. Appx. 49 (3d Cir. 2013).  We held that Rooker-Feldman applied  
because granting Gage’s request for relief would have invalidated a state court judgment, 
and that Sheriff Provenzano was entitled to qualified immunity.  See id. at 50-51.
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 On February 9, 2012, Gage filed another civil action pro se in federal court, again 
suing Wells Fargo and adding the Andersens as defendants.  Again, he alleged that the 
foreclosure and sale of his property had been procured through fraud and criminal 
conduct, and, in addition, he alleged that the Andersens had obstructed justice by failing 
                                              
1
 Pursuant to Rooker - Feldman, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
engage in appellate review of state court determinations.  See Turner v. Crawford Square 
Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006).  
2
 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects a government official from a claim for 
damages when his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982). 
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to respond to a subpoena he issued in the first federal action.  In connection with this 
lawsuit, on February 28, 2012, Gage filed a notice of lis pendens, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:15-7(b), in the Somerset County Clerk’s Office.  The parties moved to dismiss the 
complaint, and the Andersens also moved to strike the lis pendens.  On July 9, 2013, the 
District Court dismissed this second federal complaint, struck the lis pendens, and 
enjoined Gage from filing any similar lawsuits in the future.  Among other things, the 
court held that its previous determination was res judicata as to the claims against Wells 
Fargo.  Gage appeals. 
 We will affirm.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We engage in 
plenary review of the District Court’s dismissal of Gage’s complaint.  See Jordan v. Fox, 
Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).  Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon 
which may be granted.  In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the 
Supreme Court held that the factual allegations set forth in a complaint “must be enough 
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”  Id. at 555.  In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 679 (2009), the Court explained that “the tenet that a court must accept as true 
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”  
Therefore, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying 
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the 
assumption of truth.”  Id. at 664.    
Gage’s allegations against Wells Fargo in Counts 1 through 4 are essentially 
identical to his allegations in his first federal civil action; they continue to be barred by 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, just as the District Court concluded.  Cf. Elkadrawy v. 
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Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (with respect to res judicata, 
whether subsequent suits involve same claim does not depend on legal theory invoked, 
but rather on similarity of underlying events giving rise to claims).  Nothing in Gage’s 
second federal complaint required the District Court to revisit its original determination, 
one that we affirmed, that Rooker-Feldman applied because granting Gage’s request for 
relief would have invalidated a lawful state court foreclosure judgment.  Accordingly, 
dismissal of all claims against Wells Fargo was proper.  Insofar as Gage contested the 
Andersens’ right to possess the property, this claim also is barred by Rooker-Feldman, 
because the Andersens’ purchase of the property from Wells Fargo stemmed from the 
lawful foreclosure action.   
The claim that Sheriff Provenzano did not sell the property for the proper amount 
cannot be pursued in this action because he is not a named defendant, and, even if he 
were a named defendant, the claim would be barred by res judicata.  See United States v. 
Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984) (res judicata bars subsequent 
action when prior decision was final judgment on merits, litigants or their privies are 
same, and subsequent suit is based on same cause of action); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 
127, 131 (1979) (res judicata also prevents litigation of claims that were previously 
available even if not asserted).   
 In Count 5 of the second federal complaint, Gage alleged that the Andersens 
obstructed justice by refusing to comply with his subpoena in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1505 and § 1510.  The District Court properly dismissed this claim under Rule 12(b)(6) 
because these criminal statutes do not unambiguously confer a private right of action.  
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002).  Gage alleged that the 
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Andersons “hijacked” his personal property.  This claim, as explained by the District 
Court, is facially insufficient, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (only 
complaint that states plausible claim for relief survives motion to dismiss), and was 
properly dismissed. 
 In moving to dismiss the complaint, the Andersens also asked the District Court to 
enjoin Gage from using their address as his own, and to discharge the lis pendens.  
Pursuant to its equitable powers, the District Court enjoined Gage from using 51 Hillcrest 
Blvd., Warren, New Jersey, as his personal address for any reason as long as he is not the 
lawful owner of the property, and Gage has not persuaded us that the District Court erred 
in this respect.  Concerning the lis pendens, the District Court determined that it no 
longer served any legitimate purpose in view of the second federal complaint’s complete 
lack of merit, citing Manzo v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 677 A.2d 224, 227 (N.J. Super. Ct., 
App. Div. 1996) (purpose of lis pendens is to preserve property which is subject matter of 
the lawsuit so that judicial relief can be granted if plaintiff prevails).  The District Court 
determined that the lis pendens should be discharged in view of Gage’s numerous, 
unsuccessful attempts to overturn the state court foreclosure judgment.  We conclude that 
the discharge plainly was proper.   
 Last, the District Court found that Gage was engaging in vexatious litigation and 
enjoined him from filing any further lawsuits with respect to the state foreclosure 
judgment.  The court found that his claims had been litigated multiple times in state and 
federal court, and that, during the pendency of the instant action, he had filed yet another 
federal civil action against Wells Fargo.  Therefore, in order to promote judicial 
efficiency, and to prevent him from filing any more frivolous lawsuits against these same 
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parties or parties associated with the state court foreclosure judgment, the District Court 
issued a narrowly-tailored injunction barring Gage from filing any further federal civil 
actions, without leave of court, relating to the state foreclosure judgment that were not in 
compliance with Rule 11. 
 District courts in this circuit may issue an injunction under the All Writs Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1651(a), to require litigants who have engaged in abusive, groundless, and 
vexatious litigation to obtain approval of the court before filing further complaints.  See 
Chipps v. U.S. District Court for Middle District of Pa., 882 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1989).  We 
agree with the District Court that this vexatious litigation on Gage’s part is likely to 
continue absent some restriction on Gage, see id. at 73; see also In re: Oliver, 682 F.2d 
443, 444 (3d Cir. 1982), but it does not appear that the District Court gave Gage notice 
and an opportunity to respond, which are required when injunctions of this type are 
issued.   See, e.g., Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987).  In his 
Informal Brief Gage contends only that there was no valid assignment of the mortgage to 
Wells Fargo prior to the filing of the foreclosure complaint in which Wells Fargo claimed 
to be the holder of the mortgage.  Although he seeks the recusal of the District Judge and 
claims bias, see Informal Brief, at 27, he does not contest the order enjoining him from 
filing any further actions in federal court concerning the foreclosure.  When an issue is 
not pursued in the brief or even mentioned, the appellant has abandoned and waived that 
issue on appeal, absent extraordinary circumstances.  We find none here.  See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182-83 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1993); Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 
947 F.2d 1042, 1065-66 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, we affirm the order enjoining 
Gage.  We also reject as meritless Gage’s argument that the District Judge is biased.  The 
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allegation was based on the District Judge’s determination to twice apply Rooker-
Feldman, but a party’s displeasure with the court’s legal rulings does not form an 
adequate basis for recusal.  See Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 
F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court dismissing 
the complaint.  The Andersens’ motion  for the Court to take judicial notice of the 
District Court’s and our opinion in a related action is granted.  
